Saturday, December 19, 2009
To state it bluntly, this movie was awesome as a whole. James Cameron did a great job with all the “mechanics” of any quality movie. The acting was good, the script was good, the graphics were stupendous, and the flow was great. So much so that during the movie I forgot I was watching a movie and to me that’s a mark of a great movie. The story sucked me in and kept me in its grasp the whole length of the movie, which is almost 3 hours. The casting was well done and I felt like all the actors really did a good job. I didn’t feel like I was left hanging in any particular scene because the acting was subpar. When it came to the graphics, this movie was top dog and one you should definitely see in 3D (I didn’t, but I will). I’d say the graphics were better than most of the big movies I’ve seen recently, including 2012. However, not better than Star Trek, but just as good. In fact, a good comparison of this movie to another would be to compare it to Star Trek in quality. All round good.
Now on to what this movie really is about and what its message (intentionally or unintentionally) is communicating to the audience. When it comes to message, this movie compares really well to Dances with Wolves. In this case however, mankind as a whole is the bad guy. Having destroyed nature and anything “green” on Earth, man is like a virus consuming resources wherever they can be found. So, mankind as a whole is shown in a negative light from the beginning. Man’s existence as portrayed in this movie appears to be gritty and dark. Lots of metal everywhere and everything is just kind of dark, not shiny and clean. Earth is never shown, so this may be just the human presence at Pandora that appears this way, but I don’t think it is.
Pandora is a planet that is packed full of incredible life forms of all types imaginable. Many leave you seriously impressed and dazzled. The natives of Pandora, the Na’vi, are huge blue hominids that live in a primitive society. In fact, you could say that the Na’vi people are a liberal interpretation of what the Native Americans were like in the Americas during the 1500s through the 1800s. The natives are portrayed as “one with nature,” peaceful and good. This is reinforced by the awesome visuals that accompany the scenes with the natives showing lots of life, lots of light, and lots of beauty. A real Garden of Eden paradise, which of course Man is coming to consume, pollute, and destroy.
Basically, no diplomatic solution is reached to move the Na’vi settlement which is on top of a huge priceless mineral deposit. The corporation running the mining operation is shown as ruthless and callous in its pursuit of profit, leaving behind morals, ethics, and even common sense at times. This is part of the message in this movie, that corporations are inherently evil and that profit drives everything. Technology is also shown as dark, metallic, unnatural, and mostly geared toward war. The military uses this technology to support the corporation’s mining operations. Of course, the military is also portrayed as full of “jarheads” that really only want war and thus are evil. In fact, in the movie the military states that they need to fight terror with terror and use “shock and awe” to force the natives to cooperate. This is obviously a knock at the Bush policies. So yes, this movie does have a political agenda or message. On top of that, the scientists are shown as the only reasonable people in what seems all of humanity. Glorifying scientists, the thus science, is fine but science is hardly the answer to everything. I can't help but draw parallels between glorifying science and how that's tied to the global warming debate in our current affairs.
The bottom-line is this movie was very well done and very fun. I laughed, I cried, I really felt compassion for the Na’vi. However, the underlying messages that the movie was sending I have to take issue with because people love to take shots at corporations, the military, and industry. And really and truly you can’t paint these pieces of modern society with such a broad generalization. I believe that the current system in the United States of capitalism is good. That businesses are made up of people just like you and me and are therefore not inherently evil, because I believe that man is inherently more good than evil. If indeed one of the messages of this movie is that massive regulation is needed otherwise corporations will destroy our Earth, ravishing it for all resources to make profits, then this is obviously wrong from my point of view. Checks and balances are always necessary, but not massive regulation.
So from the many messages this movie is promoting, whether it’s that the Americas were ravaged by the Old World several centuries ago, a longing for simpler existence that is “one with nature,” or that the military and corporations are evil, this movie is definitely political. The Bush references were what sealed the deal for me. But you should see this movie, definitely, and see it in 3D.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
When it comes down to city council, I used the same standards and I believe that Brenda Stardig (on the right) will do a fantastic job of being fiscally conservative and help transform District A into a better place. Her competitor is Lane Lewis who really doesn't have near the amount of experience that Brenda Stardig has and I don't believe he'd be very conservative.
Saturday, November 14, 2009
I thought this cartoon was really disturbing when I first saw it. The way Western Civilization cripples itself with political correctness, progressivism, socialism, and other liberal ideas expose America to fatal attacks. I think that as Americans we have to acknowledge that even though we have a free society with freedom of speech, there are ideologies out there that if left unchecked can destroy that freedom. The great American experiment can be destroyed by radical Islam, communism, socialism, fascism, liberal progressivism (which really is just a front for socialism), and Black Liberation philosophy (like what Rev. Wright is always preaching).
Thursday, November 12, 2009
Wednesday, October 28, 2009
The current debate over Social Security reform is reminiscent of the discussions that occurred in Galveston County, Texas, in 1980, when county workers were offered a retirement alternative to Social Security: At the time they reacted with keen interest and some knee-jerk fear of the unknown. But after 24 years, folks here can say unequivocally that when Galveston County pulled out of the Social Security system in 1981, we were on the road to providing our workers with a better deal than Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.
The Problem with Social Security. Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system under which taxes collected from today's workers are used to pay today's retirees. That was sustainable in the past; for example, in 1950 there were 16 workers providing benefits for each retiree. However, today the ratio has dropped to 3 workers for each retiree, and by the year 2030 the ratio will be 2 to 1.
America's demographic changes and the program's expansion have driven the initial Social Security tax rate from 2 percent (1 percent each from employer and employee) to 12.4 percent today, and threaten to drive it even higher. This unsustainable trend is why policy makers are looking for ways to reform the system.
One of the most prominent proposed reforms would allow younger workers to divert some of the payroll taxes they already pay to create personal retirement accounts. The burden on future taxpayers would decline as retirees draw retirement benefits from their personal accounts, reducing the demand for taxpayer-funded benefits. Current and near-retirees would be unaffected and would continue to receive currently scheduled benefits. But how should the new accounts be structured? Some point to Chile, Britain, Australia or one of almost 30 countries that have incorporated personal investments into their public pension programs. But there are examples much closer to home.
The initial Social Security Act permitted municipal governments to opt out of the system - a loophole that Congress closed in 1983. In 1981, employees of Galveston County, Texas, chose by a vote of 78 percent to 22 percent to leave Social Security for a private alternative. Brazoria and Matagorda counties soon followed, swelling the private plan to more than 5,000 participants today. In the private plan, contributions are similar to those for Social Security but returns are quite different.
The Galveston Plan. In 1979, many county workers were concerned about the soundness of Social Security, as many people are today. We could either stay with it - and its inevitable tax increases and higher retirement ages - or find a better way. We sought an "alternative plan" that provided the same or better benefits, required no tax increases and was risk-free. Furthermore, we wanted the benefits to be like a savings account that could be passed on to family members upon death.
Our plan, put together by financial experts, was a "banking model" rather than an "investment model." To eliminate the risks of the up-and-down stock market, workers' contributions were put into conservative fixed-rate guaranteed annuities, rather than fluctuating stocks, bonds or mutual funds. Our results have been impressive: We've averaged an annual rate of return of about 6.5 percent over 24 years. And we've provided substantially better benefits in all three Social Security categories: retirement, survivorship and disability.
Galveston officials held meetings that included debates with Social Security officials and put it to a vote: Galveston County employees passed it by a 3-to-1 margin in 1981 - just in time.
The Galveston Plan was implemented just before the U.S. Congress passed a reform bill in 1983 that closed the door for local governments to opt out of Social Security.
To be sure, our plan wasn't perfect, and we have made some adjustments. For instance, a few of our retired county workers are critical of the plan today because they say they are making less money than they would have on Social Security. This is because our plan allowed workers to make "hardship" withdrawals from the retirement plan during their working years. Some workers withdrew funds for current financial problems and consequently robbed their own future benefits. We closed that option in January 2005.
Galveston vs. Social Security. Upon retirement after 30 years, and assuming a 5 percent rate of return - more conservative than Galveston workers have earned - all workers would do better for the same contribution as Social Security:
Retirement Benefits%3A Galveston Plan vs Social Security
* Workers making $17,000 a year are expected to receive about 50 percent more per month on our alternative plan than on Social Security - $1,036 instead of $683. [See the Figure.]
* Workers making $26,000 a year will make almost double Social Security's return - $1,500 instead of $853.
* Workers making $51,000 a year will get $3,103 instead of $1,368.
* Workers making $75,000 or more will nearly triple Social Security - $4,540 instead of $1,645.
* Galveston County's survivorship benefits pay four times a worker's annual salary - a minimum of $75,000 to a maximum $215,000 - versus Social Security, which forces widows to wait until age 60 to qualify for benefits, or provides 75 percent of a worker's salary for school-age children.
In Galveston, if the worker dies before retirement, the survivors receive not only the full survivorship but get generous accidental death benefits, too. Galveston County's disability benefit also pays more: 60 percent of an individual's salary, better than Social Security's.
Two government studies of the Galveston Plan - by the Government Accountability Office and the Social Security Administration - claim that low-wage workers do better under Social Security. However, these studies assumed a low 4 percent return, which is the minimum rate of return on annuities guaranteed by the insurance companies. The actual returns have been substantially higher.
Guidance for Today's Reformers. Congress could consider making participation in any privatization plan voluntary at first. We made our plan voluntary in the beginning and 70 percent joined. It later became mandatory, and now there is full participation. Also, if some workers remain uncertain about investing a portion of their contributions, the plan could include a guarantee that low-income earners receive the same funds they would get with total participation in Social Security.
Our experience has shown that even though low-income workers would do better, a guarantee would ease their worries. Moderate- and higher-income workers would do much better, as ours do, because they have invested more in the plan and are not prejudicially punished or "topped out" on retirement benefits, as they are in Social Security.
In today's debate about whether to partially privatize Social Security, the Galveston County plan is sometimes demagogued. But our experience should be judged factually and fairly, not emotionally, politically or on the basis of hearsay. We sought a secure, risk-free alternative to the Social Security system, and it has worked very well for nearly a quarter-century. Our retirees have prospered, and our working people have had the security of generous disability and accidental death benefits.
Most important, we didn't force our children and grandchildren to be unduly taxed and burdened for our retirement while these fine young people are struggling to raise and provide for their own families.
What has been good for Galveston County may, indeed, be good for this country.
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
This treatise will analyze FEMA’s poor response to the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina and propose changes to FEMA’s organizational structure and culture. Although FEMA is not solely responsible for the poor government response in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (state and local governments were also dysfunctional), the scope of this analysis is on FEMA’s response and how they can better themselves for responding to future disasters of similar magnitude.
Most of us are familiar with the tragedy that occurred on the
The Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, has been around in one form or another since the 19th century. However, the FEMA we know today was first instituted by an executive order by President Carter in 1979. This order merged more than 100 federal agencies like the Federal Insurance Administration and the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration enabling the federal government to more effectively manage national disasters. FEMA is tasked with responding to, planning for, recovering from and mitigating against disasters. Its mission statement reads, “to lead
The merging of government agencies shifted the power to a focused point of centralization. This centralization continued to grow as FEMA also absorbed many redundant and parallel state and local agencies that existed at the time. This is one of FEMA’s weaknesses that lead to the slow and inadequate response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster. The over centralization made it so FEMA’s top management was making the organization’s key decisions with little or no input from lower-level personnel. Congressman Shays stated that he believed, “FEMA suffers from bureaucratic fatigue with a command structure that is not decentralized to allow people on the ground to make decisions.” With a centralization of power it became more difficult for FEMA to make quick decisions to help with the disaster relief as it became very apparent in
Not only did FEMA have over centralization of decision power, but its top managers were largely inexperienced in emergency management. Michael Brown (former FEMA Director) and Patrick Rhode (former FEMA Deputy Director) were not only inexperienced, but friends of President Bush and appointed to their positions without any relevant credentials for their FEMA positions. To make matters worse, FEMA had seen an exodus of experienced officials over the past four years. When Katrina struck, there were three senior executive positions still vacant. Many believe this exodus was caused when FEMA was placed under the Department of Homeland Security and then downgraded even further to a branch of DHS. That change appears to have radically transformed the psychological contracts that employees had with the former FEMA organization causing them to feel disgruntled and the desire to leave. With that “brain drain” of experienced officials and apparent lack of knowledge retention coupled with the failure of state and local governments to respond, FEMA was left high and dry and unable to act effectively.
This shift to DHS may seem logical at first since responding to a terrorist attack has a lot in common with responding to a natural disaster. In spite of this, however, DHS failed to build on top of the existing emergency response infrastructure of FEMA and terrorism became a new and largely separate focus. In a Government Accountability Office report, more than 75% of the agency’s preparedness grants for next year are targeted to state and local readiness for terrorism.[iv] This conflict of focus is a natural result of the addition of another layer of bureaucracy because of the merging of DHS and FEMA.
Before FEMA was assimilated by DHS, they were an independent agency with direct accountability to the president. With DHS now on top of FEMA, the chain of command and organizational hierarchy became more ambiguous. With a more nebulous chain of command FEMA employees began to lose sight of FEMA’s mission because of their inability to clearly answer, “Who am I responsible to, FEMA, DHS or the President?” Jane Bullock, former FEMA Director during the Clinton Administration stated during an interview with CBS News in regards to FEMA’s relief efforts during the Hurricane Katrina disaster, “Who’s in charge? Is it FEMA Director Mike Brown? Is it Chertoff (DHS Director)? You don’t really know. And I think that’s going to be a continuing and even worse problem as we get into the recovery…”[v] FEMA’s identity crisis, caused by a vague chain of command and role conflict, is one of the major contributing factors of its ineptitude shown during the Katrina crisis. Since 9/11 the focus has been on terrorism and that is the focus of DHS. FEMA became swept up in this vision and lost its focus on covering all disasters.
In addition to FEMA’s vague chain of command and role conflict, FEMA’s organizational hierarchy became larger and more complex when they were merged with DHS. What this means is more levels of middle management with managers having oversight over fewer employees appeared. Although manager’s can maintain tighter control of their employees this way, it also makes vertical communication in the organization more complex, slows down decision making, isolates upper management and discourages employee autonomy. All of which contributed to FEMA’s failed response. From the pages of email and memos subpoenaed by a House panel, it becomes clear that there was bureaucratic chaos running ramped in FEMA throughout the entire ordeal until Chertoff finally placed Coast Guard Vice Admiral Thad Allen in charge of relief efforts. A few excerpts from emails the top FEMA official in Mississippi sent gives a small taste of this chaos, “We are getting less than 25 percent of what we have been requesting from HQ daily.“ When asked where FEMA Director Michael Brown was he responded, “Not here in MS (
So, why did FEMA fail during Katrina and not during other past disasters? The explanation to this question is the same explanation for the majority of FEMA’s woes; they are a monstrosity of a bureaucracy and displayed all the negative attributes of being such. The primary strength of a bureaucracy is its ability to perform standardized activities in a highly efficient manner. They function well with problems that are “run of the mill” and because of this they can get away with hiring less talented/experienced managers. The rules and regulations substitute for innovative and experienced managers. The drawback is when a situation arises that does not precisely fit the rules, there is no room for modification or innovation. Congressman Shays commented on this saying, “What Mr. Brown didn't realize was that this was such a unique circumstance, he needed to step in, be extraordinarily aggressive, fill in the void left by the incompetence of the state and local government (and FEMA management). He should have taken charge if no one else was.” FEMA’s external operating environment, and even its charter, focuses FEMA on handling dynamic and unique disasters that can hit without notice. Because of this dynamic environment FEMA must operate in, a bureaucratic structure will not work. Bureaucracies perform better in a static environment. When Katrina hit with all of its unique challenges, FEMA’s bureaucratic structure failed.
FEMA’s inability to cope with the Katrina crisis has lead some to suggest giving the responsibility to another organization such as the military. During the Katrina crisis, the Coast Guard was placed in control of relief efforts after FEMA dropped the ball and did a very good job considering the circumstances. Approximately 60,000 National Guard troops helped during the disaster recovery. However, the military is a bureaucracy too. Nevertheless, the military’s vast resources, lightning fast mobility, high formalization (strong culture of discipline), and strong chain of command made this possible, but comes at a $400 billion/year price tag. Due to constitutional issues the military is not a viable solution to the problem. Also, if the military were to take on this responsibility, they risk role conflict by becoming a jack of all trades, master of none. One thing is for sure, FEMA must change if they are to meet their original charter.
My recommendation is for FEMA and DHS to once again be separate agencies. FEMA must be independent of any other agency in order to clarify its chain of command (direct to the President), regain its focus, and cut out the debilitating excess overhead. FEMA should even go as far as to drop its charter for responding to all disasters and focus only on natural disasters, leaving DHS to handle domestic civil defense and terrorist concerns. At the very least, the chain of command must be clearly defined and the enormous organizational hierarchy simplified and shrunk in order for FEMA to begin to be effective again. However, the change needed for FEMA to realize its charter effectively is a revolutionary change not an evolutionary change, thus the recommendation to separate FEMA and DHS.
The organizational structure of FEMA should also change to become more open, transparent, and “organic,” an organization less like a bureaucracy. This would enable FEMA to deregulate itself, tear down vertical, horizontal and external communication and bureaucratic barriers. In line with making FEMA more “organic,” FEMA must become more decentralized, flatten its hierarchy, clarify the chain of command, and utilize cross functional teams to facilitate interdepartmental cooperation with important stakeholders (such as law enforcement agencies).
Another very important recommended change is modifying the culture of FEMA to allow for innovative decentralized decision making by those on the ground and closest to the action. This would provide many benefits to FEMA such as retaining experienced employees through increased job satisfaction, providing faster more relevant actions thereby improving service quality, and even decreasing costs by flattening the organizational hierarchy. Free employees from the bureaucracy and engage their minds and you will resolve problems with impressive speed.[vii] In addition, employees would feel a sense of ownership for their decisions and accountability would be easier to trace. The increased ownership would increase employee motivation and job satisfaction. Employees that welcome empowerment should be the focus for all hiring efforts.
To accomplish empowering the employees it is proposed that FEMA establish a new department that would implement Centers of Excellence for employees. These Centers of Excellence are about providing a strategy and structure that facilitates the growth of people by giving them the opportunity to do their best work. They enable people to use their unique talents and abilities to the best interest of the business or institution, in other words, it empowers them.[viii] The main focus of COEs is to provide the skill sets necessary to employees that concentrate on the core purposes and competencies of an organization. Less focus on transferring control over employees and more focus on empowering those employees through developing those skills that will help them the most in the organization. The key benefit of this organizational principle is that the development of people becomes the important issue, not implementation of projects. With employees being nurtured and developed they are able to perform closer to their inherent potential and this in turn lifts the entire organization to a much more efficient and effective sphere of operation. Ironic that the focus of FEMA is all about people when they have been unable to give the same attention and focus for their own employees. With the COE model in effect, FEMA will be much more capable of retaining experienced employees. In FEMA’s case, the COE model will help them to respond quickly to major disasters with fewer problems that stem from bureaucratic red tape, poor communication between functional groups, and lack of disaster management experience.
In addition to empowering employees, management must become involved with events and problems on the ground. They must be aware of the real issues facing those on the frontlines. This can only be done by changing their perspectives. To accomplish this, managers should get “down and dirty” by engaging with those on the frontlines and working with them on the ground as an additional hand. They must also be doing this in all areas of the organization to get a real bird’s eye view of the entire state of affairs in the organization. With this fresh, “from the balcony” perspective senior managers from all parts of FEMA and DHS (if they determine to remain with DHS) will be able to make much more educated decisions that can greatly benefit the organization.
Katrina’s impact was huge and would have been devastating regardless of FEMA’s ability to respond to emergencies. Nevertheless, FEMA’s bureaucratic organizational structure turned FEMA into something akin to New Orleans’ famous levees; a structure sure to fail when a big disaster struck.[ix] For FEMA to respond to future major disasters they must change their organization to increase flexibility, speed up decision making, cut overhead, and empower employees. Sooner or later another “big one” will hit and FEMA must be ready to act. Hopefully, they have learned these valuable lessons from their big plunder and will streamline their organization to meet any disaster they may face, head on.
Written by Marc Anderson
[vii] Essentials of Organizational Behavior, Stephen P. Robbins, 2005, pp. 65
[viii] Centers of Excellence: Empowering People to Manage Change, Steven W. Lyle and Robert A. Zawacki, 1996, pp. 1
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
With mindsets like this, no wonder politicians think paying taxes is patriotic and no wonder they think raising taxes is perfectly OK. Are we a socialist nation yet? Is government too big yet? Where is the line the divides our government from totalitarianism?